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Abstract 
Although theoretical and empirical work on the democratic legitimacy of governance 
networks is growing, little attention has been paid to the impact of mediatisation on 
democracies. Media have their own logic of news-making led by the media’s rules, aims, 
production routines and constraints, which affect political decision-making processes. In 
this article we specifically study how media and their logic affect three democratic 
legitimacy sources of political decision making within governance networks: voice, due 
deliberation and accountability. We conducted a comparative case study of three local 
governance networks using a mixed method design, combining extensive qualitative case 
studies, interviews and a quantitative content analysis of media reports. In all three cases, 
media logic increased voice possibilities for citizen groups. Furthermore, it broadened the 
deliberation process, although this did not improve the quality of this process per se, 
because of the media focus on drama and negativity. Thirdly, media logic often pushed 
political authorities into a reactive communication style as they had to fight against 
negative images in the media. Proactive communication about projects, such as PR 
strategies and branding, is difficult in such a media landscape. 
 
Key words: Media logic; mediatisation; democratic legitimacy; governance networks; 
citizen groups; water management 
 
                                                 
1
 The article has been published in Local Government Studies (2014), Volume 40, Issue 5, p.705-728, and 
can be found at: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03003930.2013.859139#.VDf1c2d_veA  
2 
 
Mediatised Legitimacy within Local Governance Networks 
In contemporary democracies, political authorities often experience tremendous difficulty 
in legitimating their position and actions, especially in response to complex societal 
issues that cross different institutional boundaries (e.g. Beck et al. 2003, Hajer 2003, 
Peters 2010). Media play an important role in legitimising processes (Habermas 2006, 
Hajer 2009). In this article, we are interested in the influence of the media, and 
particularly media logic, on the democratic legitimacy of political decision making in 
governance networks. Although the democratic legitimacy of governance networks is a 
highly debated issue in the literature (e.g. Pierre 2000, Papadopoulos 2003, Sørensen and 
Torfing 2005), little attention is paid to the impact of the media and media logic in this 
respect (e.g. Hajer 2009). Important sources of democratic legitimacy, such as voice, due 
deliberation and accountability, are influenced by the media. The media could be used as 
a vehicle for stakeholders to put their issues on the political agenda. They could provide a 
platform for debate and also act as a forum for political authorities to brand their policies 
and to create legitimacy for their actions.  
However, the media are not neutral information transmitters, but, like all 
institutions, shape and select information in certain ways (Altheide and Snow 1979, 
Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999, Cook 2005, Parkinson 2006). The process of news-making 
led by the media’s rules, aims, production routines and constraints is known as media 
logic (Altheide and Snow 1979, Brants and van Praag 2006, Hjarvard 2008, Strömbäck 
and Esser 2009). News-making depends to a great extent on the news values that 
journalists ascribe to events or viewpoints, but also on organisational pressures on 
journalists such as deadlines and economic goals (Shoemaker and Reese 1996). Research 
by Patterson (2000) and Bennett (2009) has identified general trends in this media logic: 
news is increasingly negative, particularly towards authorities, as well as dramatised and 
personalised.  
An important question then is how these characteristics of media logic affect 
sources of democratic legitimacy within governance networks, which we examine in this 
article. In the literature on mediatisation, it is argued that, within present-day 
democracies, media and their logic are very influential, even to the extent that media 
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logic overrules other institutional logics, such as political logic (Mazzoleni and Schulz 
1999, Cook 2005, Strömbäck and Esser 2009).  
We conducted a comparative case study of three local water management 
projects, using a mixed method design. Although we are aware that a variety of actors are 
involved in governance networks, we concentrate on two important groups of actors 
relevant to the democratic legitimacy of political decision making: political authorities 
and citizens (organised in citizen groups). To measure the presence of media logic and 
media attention on both citizen groups and political authorities, we conducted a 
quantitative content analysis on media reports about the projects (N=290). Case study 
analyses, and specifically interviews with key representatives of both groups, were used 
to further examine the way in which citizen groups and political authorities interacted 
with the media and how this affected legitimacy sources.  
In the first part of the article, we elaborate how media logic could theoretically 
influence different sources of democratic legitimacy in governance networks. In the 
second part, we discuss our mixed method design. This is followed by an analysis of the 
results of our study. Lastly, we discuss our findings in the concluding section.  
 
Democratic Legitimacy as a Communicative Process between Political Authorities 
and Citizens  
In this study we focus on governance networks around complex water projects. Complex 
water projects could be typified as boundary-crossing public issues, as they cross 
different geographical, societal, administrative and institutional borders (Edelenbos and 
Teisman 2011; van Meerkerk et al. 2013). The network around such projects consists of a 
variety of interdependent governmental, private, and societal actors (including citizen 
groups), who interact with each other to influence the policy and decision-making 
process by means of negotiation, persuasion, and collaboration (Van Buuren et al. 2010; 
Edelenbos et al. 2013). 
The democratic legitimacy of political decisions in such governance networks is 
not straightforward as there are no clear constitutional rules and norms that determine 
what constitutes a legitimate decision. As Hajer (2009, p. 30) rightly points out: ‘the 
primacy of the politics presupposes that the council of elected representatives confers 
4 
 
legitimacy on the decisions it takes. Yet when policy problems do not respect the 
territorial scales, this system breaks down.’ This means that, in the words of Warren 
(2009, p. 7), ‘the legitimacy generated by electoral democracy does not carry over to 
[these] issue-segmented constituencies.’  
Many authors therefore stress the importance of communicative relationships 
between political authorities and affected stakeholders in the construction of legitimacy 
for political decisions in governance networks (e.g. Bang 2003, Dryzek 2010). 
Traditional policymaking is characterised by a domination of expert-based knowledge 
and rather unilateral modes of communication between experts and decision makers 
(Crozier 2008, Wagenaar 2007). Information flows in governance networks are rather 
multilateral, and communicative capacity is more egalitarian. Furthermore, ‘messages 
undergo transformations as receivers interpret and process information in creative and 
self-referential ways that can easily escape the original intentions of the sender’ (Crozier 
2008, p. 9). Media, as an important communication  channel, also select and transform 
information.  
Generating legitimacy is for an important part dependent on managing 
information flows, as relevant information loops concerning policy and decision making 
are more integrative and dynamic. Different stakeholders part of the governance network 
contribute to the generation and spreading of information in the policy and decision-
making process, not seldom using media. 
By legitimacy we mean a generalised preparedness to accept, within a certain 
margin, a decision or policy by those to whom it is supposed to apply (see Luhmann 
1975). As decisions and policymaking around complex governance issues often take a 
considerable amount of time (e.g. Teisman 2000), in which preferences and perceptions 
of actors can change, we could therefore also speak of a process of acceptance (cf. 
Dryzek 2010). This is also emphasised by deliberative models of democracy, which 
locate the source of legitimacy in the process of deliberation between actors (Manin 
1987). In this process of acceptance, different sources of legitimacy are important. 
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Different sources of legitimacy in governance networks 
Various models of democracy stress varying sources of democratic legitimacy. 
We focus on three different sources of democratic legitimacy that are especially relevant 
for analysing decision-making processes in governance networks (see Klijn 2011). These 
three sources derive mainly from the deliberative model of democracy. This model goes 
relatively well with the nature of governance networks, as compared to more traditional 
models of democracy (Sørensen 2002, Dryzek 2010, van Meerkerk et al. 2014).
i
  
As a first source of democratic legitimacy in governance networks, voice is an 
important consideration. Voice is about the way in which affected stakeholders can 
provide input in the decision-making process (Manin 1987, Dryzek 2007). To what extent 
are citizens enabled to express their wishes and interests in political decision making and 
how easy is it to get issues on to the political agenda (Bekkers and Edwards 2007)? 
Secondly, democratic legitimacy in governance networks is dependent on the quality of 
the deliberation process: due deliberation. To what extent are different perspectives 
included in the decision-making process? In this sense, legitimacy is derived from the 
extent a decision receives reflective assent through participation in authentic deliberation 
by those subjected to the decision in question (Cohen 1989). Mutual exchange of 
information, perceptions and preferences could induce a learning process by which well-
informed and reasoned decision making could take place. This is grounded on the 
assumption that individuals’ preferences are not fixed, but can change in debate and 
political dialogue (Held 2006). The transparency of the decision-making process and 
open information access are also often mentioned parameters of due deliberation (Dryzek 
2000). Accountability of decision makers to the public is a third source of democratic 
legitimacy. In governance networks, accountability is often diffuse and spread among 
different actors and governmental layers (Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden 2004, Hajer 
2009). However, particular officeholders often function as the public face around 
decisions or a specific policy (Eshuis and Klijn 2012). Providing information and 
explaining certain decisions in the media is important for politically responsible actors to 
generate legitimacy and to convince their electorate that their actions are right and 
necessary. 
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Mediatised legitimacy 
 
Role of media in democracies 
Graber (2003) summarises four different functions of news media within democracies (p. 
143): 
 Providing a forum for discussion of diverse, often conflicting ideas; 
 Giving voice to public opinion; 
 Collecting information about political events, serving as citizens’ eyes and ears to 
survey the political scene and the performance of politicians; 
 Acting as a public watchdog that ‘barks loudly’ when it encounters misbehaviour 
(e.g. corruption, abuse of power) in the halls of government. 
 
Although these are potential functions of news media, rather than an accurate description 
of their routine performance (Graber 2003, 2004), these functions are strongly connected 
to the legitimacy sources discussed above. The media can open up the political and policy 
agenda, giving voice to citizen groups. Furthermore, as they provide a forum for 
discussion, they impact on the quality of the deliberation process. Thirdly, as they inform 
citizens about the performance of politicians, they affect the accountability relationship 
of political authorities towards citizens. The media facilitate or mediate these legitimacy 
sources, at least to some extent. In this matter, it is important to consider how the media 
operate, as they are not neutral information transmitters, but have their own logic 
(Altheide and Snow 1979, Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999, Parkinson 2006). In the next 
section, we describe how this media logic potentially affects the role of the media 
regarding the three sources of legitimacy.  
 
Mediatisation 
As discussed in the introduction, media logic refers to ‘the process by which media 
present and transmit information’ (Altheide and Snow 1979, p. 10), led by the media’s 
rules, aims, production routines and constraints. Complex policy processes are often 
tremendously reshaped to fit the journalistic norms of newsworthiness and media formats 
(Davis 2007, Bennett 2009). Bennett (2009) describes several trends in news reporting 
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that, in his opinion, simplify complex governmental issues. He sees information biases of 
personalisation (a focus on human interest), dramatisation (an emphasis on crisis and 
conflict) and an authority–disorder bias (a claim that authorities are not able to establish 
or restore order in society) (Bennett 2009). In addition, Patterson (2000) observes a bias 
towards negativity in the news. These trends in the news can also be found in other 
studies on media content (see Brants and Neijens 1998, Semetko and Valkenburg 2000, 
Brants and van Praag 2006, Kleinnijenhuis et al. 2006, Strömbäck and Sheheta 2007).  
Many scholars argue that societies and societal institutions are submitted to, or 
become dependent on, the media and their logic to an increasing degree; they are 
increasingly mediatised (Hjarvard 2008, Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999, Reunanen et al. 
2010, Strömbäck and Esser 2009). In the context of politics, Mazzoleni and Schulz 
(1999, p. 250) argue: ‘mediatized politics is politics that has lost its autonomy, has 
become dependent in its central functions on mass media, and is continuously shaped by 
interactions with mass media.’ Meyer (2002) even speaks of a ‘colonisation’ of politics 
by media logic. As political actors adapt their communication strategies and even tailor 
their policy decisions to fit the media’s needs of timing, staging and framing, media logic 
dominates over political logic. Others expect that some institutions, policy stages and 
activities in the political process will be more mediatised than others, depending on how 
compatible they are with media logic (see Esser and Matthes 2013).  
In this study, we empirically examine the extent to which and how legitimacy 
sources are mediatised in different stages of the policy process.  
  
Mediatised voice 
Voice refers to the opportunities for citizens to participate and influence decisions. To 
what extent can they influence the decision-making agenda and can they exercise voice 
during the governance process with the help of media attention? 
 Citizens often organise themselves in citizen groups. Although these groups are 
often to some extent involved in processes of network governance, they have less power 
resources than other actors in the decision-making process. Citizen groups can increase 
their influence by gaining media attention (Kunelius and Reunanen 2011, Spörer-Wagner 
and Marcinkowski 2010). They then strive to shape the news in order to set their issue 
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and their frame on the agenda of decision makers; this is also known as agenda setting 
(Baumgartner and Jones 2009, Cobb and Elder 1983, Cook et al. 1983, McCombs 2004) 
and framing power (Fischer 2003, Terkildsen et al. 1998). As Entman (2007) argues, 
decision makers use the news as a surrogate for public opinion. In this respect, news 
coverage of a citizen group’s statements may change the targets and efforts of decision 
makers in the decision-making processes. News reports influence the context in which 
officials bargain and decide (Cook 2005).  
Since media logic influences the selection and framing of societal actors’ 
messages (Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999), we argue that it plays an intermediating part in 
the source of voice. Success in shaping the news is often more related to journalistic 
norms than to actual pressure group strength as Terkildsen et al. (1998) note. They 
mention the following criteria as influencing this success: spokespersons’ accessibility, 
rules of issue simplicity, drama and event-oriented coverage. Journalists need 
spokespersons to fill news holes, to meet deadlines and to provide drama (Terkildsen et 
al. 1998). In other words, citizen groups are submitted to, and become to a certain extent 
dependent on, media logic if they want to influence the decision makers’ agenda via 
media attention. Therefore, we could presume that the degree to which they are able to 
adapt to media logic affects their success.  
 
Due deliberation and mediatisation 
Habermas (2006) argues that the media play an important role in deliberative processes 
by facilitating flows of political communication throughout the political system in a 
public sphere. The media collect, select, assemble and interpret relevant issues and 
require information from the flows of political communication. They ideally could, if 
only circumstances were favourable, generate considered public opinions (Habermas 
2006).  
However, these functions of the media in the deliberative process can become 
problematic if the media focus excessively on the negative, dramatic or emotional aspects 
of governance processes (Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999, Habermas 2006, Bennett 2009). 
Rohlinger (2007, p. 145), in addition, reproaches the media for presenting only the most 
extreme elements, thereby undermining the deliberative process. In this respect, 
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information biases seem to problematise the function of the media as a public platform 
for diverse deliberations. Many authors suggest that the legitimacy of political authorities 
is under pressure in the media debate, merely because of critical reporting about them 
(Patterson 2000, Kleinnijenhuis et al. 2006, Bennett 2009, Hurrelmann et al. 2009).  
At the same time, many political actors are assisted by public relations 
practitioners and spokespersons who bridge the differences between governmental or 
political logic and media logic (Davis 2002). They provide information subsidies to 
journalists to ‘sell’ policy plans; official sources are therefore not only authoritative but 
also efficient news sources (Davis 2002, Cook 2005, Louw 2007, Eshuis and Klijn 2012). 
In times of increasing time pressure on journalists, these information subsidies have quite 
an impact on news reporting (Davis 2002).  
An unlovable press can therefore be seen as essential for the functioning of 
democracy. In particular, the often criticised characteristics of media logic – the pre-
occupation with events, with conflict and the cynicism of the media – may contribute to 
the subversion of established power (Schudson 2009). This could prevent interests of 
minority groups being easily pushed aside by powerful public and private stakeholders in 
the deliberative process. 
 
Mediatised accountability relations 
According to Hurrelmann et al. (2009, p. 487), the media serve as ‘the primary 
interface […] between citizens and the representatives of political systems; media debates 
on political issues juxtapose the self-legitimating claims of these elites and the legitimacy 
assessments of important stakeholders or professional observers.’ When political actors 
and governmental institutions want to publicly legitimate their decisions, the media are a 
highly important resource. As discussed earlier, the degree to which political authorities 
are able to adapt to media logic influences whether they manage to present their policy 
decision as successes. Through information subsidies such as press releases, press 
conferences, pre-arranged interviews and press tours – which are nowadays fully 
integrated into the process of news production – they pro-actively communicate their 
policy decisions and suppress potentially damaging stories (Davis, 2002). Adaption to 
media logic may decrease the quality of information that voters can obtain from media 
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reports on public affairs (Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999, Davis 2002, Hjarvard 2008, 
Bennett 2009). The authorities have thus professionalised their communication strategies, 
but Jacobs (2009) points out that the logic in news reporting can lead to coercive, reactive 
legitimation of decisions made. When the media increasingly focus on drama and conflict 
and hold authorities responsible for failures in governance processes, authorities have to 
react to these accusations and increase their efforts to legitimate their decisions.   
 
Mixed Methods 
To examine the influence of media logic on democratic legitimacy sources, we have 
developed a mixed method design, combining quantitative and qualitative methods to 
generate more knowledge on the phenomenon (Currall and Towler 2003).  
 
Data: three governance networks around complex water projects 
We studied three water management cases in the Netherlands: a bypass in IJsseldelta-
Zuid (near Kampen), a dike relocation in Lent (in Nijmegen) and a dike relocation in the 
area called the Noordwaard (near Werkendam). These cases are part of a national 
governmental programme, called Space for the River (Ruimte voor de rivier), which 
started officially in 2000. This programme strives for a collaborative, interactive 
governance approach aiming to increase the involvement of local citizens and investors in 
the planning process (website Ruimte voor de Rivier, van Buuren et al. 2010). As the 
national government leaves project development to the regional and local governments,  
executive local politicians often function as the face of these projects or the first political 
point of contact for citizens. 
The complex water projects are about new ways to improve water safety 
(reducing flood risks) in combination with spatial quality. As these water safety measures 
make a big claim on space in and near cities, they are confronted, and often combined, 
with other planning activities and ambitions of local and regional governments, such as 
housing, the development of recreational areas and infrastructure.  
We approached the projects as governance networks, following previous research 
on these same projects (see van Buuren et al. 2010, Klijn et al. 2010, Edelenbos et al. 
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2013). These projects (a) involve many actors (public actors such as local government, 
water boards, province; private actors such as building companies; and societal groups, 
such as environmental organisations and inhabitants), (b) have a relatively stable 
character, i.e. they have been in existence for a long period and are characterised by 
regular interactions between the actors, and (c) are dominated by wicked problems, i.e. 
the solutions proposed for problems and challenges are contested because the different 
actors have divergent perceptions of the problems and solutions (Edelenbos et al. 2013).  
In short, the water projects are developed and implemented in networks of 
interdependent actors, who employ dynamic interaction processes with one another and 
who lack clear relations of domination and subordination (although power inequalities 
exist). In all three cases, citizen groups are involved, using different strategies to 
influence the policy and decision-making process. The interactions between the actors are 
typified by a mix of negotiation, collaboration, persuasion and mutual adjustment. 
Besides direct interaction with one another, these actors could also use ‘go-alone’ 
strategies to strengthen their position (see Koppenjan and Klijn 2004).  
The three cases have been studied extensively with regard to governance process 
(van Buuren et al. 2010) on the basis of Teisman’s (2000) rounds model.ii We use these 
decision-making rounds to organise our analysis.  
 
Quantitative content analysis  
The media reports about the three projects stem from newspapers and television. The 
selection of newspaper reports started at the Lexis Nexis Academic NL database. We 
used the name of each case
iii
 as the search term, in the period from 1 January 2000 to 1 
January 2011 as the Space for the River programme started in 2000. Besides these 
newspaper reports, we searched for television items on the website of the Dutch institute 
for television and radio (http://portal.beeldengeluid.nl/) and on regional broadcasters’ 
websites. This resulted in a universe of 290 media reports.  
In the quantitative content analysis, we used Patterson’s (2000) coding scheme, 
items and coding instructions, which fit the information biases that Bennett (2009) 
describes (see also Korthagen 2013). We focused on:  
 dramatisation (news report has a substantial level of conflict framing); 
12 
 
 personalisation (news report has high or moderate human-interest 
framing) 
 negativity (news report is clearly negative/more negative than positive); 
 authority–disorder bias (news report implies a need for action and 
attributes this to a governmental institution).  
 
Furthermore, we developed an item by which one key subject in the report was 
identified. The categories of this item were based on case study research (van Buuren et 
al. 2010).
iv
 Three teams of trained coders coded the news reports, with the help of an 
extensive coding instruction. We executed two reliability tests: intra-coder (0.94) and 
inter-coder (0.91). These scores indicate that the dataset can be seen as reliable.   
 
Interviews 
Besides the interviews used to elaborate the case descriptions and analysis on the basis of 
the rounds model (see Van Buuren et al. 2010), we additionally interviewed both the 
politically responsible aldermen and the spokesmen for the citizen groups. These 
aldermen are the public face of the water projects. We picked the citizen groups most 
often present in the media reports: Citizen group Zwartendijk in the IJsseldelta-Zuid case, 
Citizen group Federation of Lent in the Lent case and citizen group Bandijk in the 
Noordwaard case.
v
 In relation to the sources of legitimacy, we asked the respondents 
about the involvement of the citizen group in the decision-making process, about the 
quality of the deliberation process and the outcomes. We additionally asked them about 
their contacts with journalists, whether they made their message more attractive for 
journalists and, if so, how they did this, and the effects of media attention. All the 
interviews were face-to-face and took about 100 minutes.
vi
 The interviews were fully 
transcribed.  
 
Results 
We first report the findings of our quantitative content analysis. Afterwards, we connect 
these findings to our interviewees’ responses, discussing the impact of media logic on the 
three sources of legitimacy in governance networks. 
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Media attention in the different rounds of decision making 
From the universe of 290 media reports, 20 reports come from national news media 
(6.9%), and 270 reports stem from local media (93.1%). In addition, 280 reports stem 
from daily papers (96.5%) against 10 items from television programmes
vii
 (3.5%).   
 
Who gets on the news? 
Table 1 shows the different groups of key subjects grouped in four categories. For 
the purposes of this study, the executive politician and citizen groups are particularly 
important. In all three cases, citizen groups are key subject in about a third of the media 
reports. In IJsseldelta-Zuid and Lent, executives are somewhat more often key subject 
than citizen groups. In Noordwaard by contrast, executive politicians are key subject in 
only one in seven media reports, whereas citizen groups feature in almost one in two.  
Adding these two groups, we see that in all three cases in a majority of the media 
reports citizen groups or executive politicians are the key subject. They are thus very 
important in the media debate. 
 
Table 1. Media coverage of actors: percentages of actors as key subject in a news report 
 IJsseldelta-
Zuid (N=100)  
(%) 
Lent  
(N=97)  
(%) 
Noordwaard  
(N=93) 
(%) 
(Prime)Minister/The state 11.0 14.4 5.4 
Provincial governor/ The province 13.0 
 
4.1 2.2 
Municipal governor /The municipality  10.0 16.5 8.6 
Executive politicians total 34.0 35.0 16.2 
Inhabitants (association) 21.0 29.9 28.0 
Farmers 2.0 1.0 9.7 
Environmental organisations  1.0 1.0 8.6 
Citizens (group) total 24.0 31.9 46.3 
Administrative officials - 3.1 8.6 
Water board 1.0 1.0 1.1 
Project organisation 16.0 2.1 6.5 
Member of the Lower House  2.0 12.4 3.2 
Member of the Provincial Council 1.0 1.0 2.2 
Member of the Municipal Council 9.0 4.1 5.4 
Other governmental actors total 29.0 23.7 27.0 
Private investors - 2.1 - 
Research institute  4.0 4.1 3.2 
Other 9.0 3.1 7.5 
Other societal actors total 13.0 9.3 10.7 
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Media attention in the different rounds of decision making 
In all three cases, citizen groups were part of the governance network, interacting 
with the initiating governmental actors and other stakeholders to negotiate and deliberate 
project plans. However, the juncture at which the citizen groups became involved, the 
way in which participation was organised and the extent to which they choose for a go-
alone strategy varies. These aspects form an explanation for the uneven distribution of 
media attention among the different rounds of decision making in all three cases, shown 
in figure 1. 
In the Noordwaard case, the citizen group was strongly involved from the 
beginning, when interactive planning sessions were organised with a variety of 
stakeholders to develop the project plan, creating much room for voice and deliberation. 
However, in the last round, when the planning process was finishing and the 
implementation process started, the communication and interaction between stakeholders 
sharply decreased. At that time, citizen group members became increasingly dissatisfied 
about the execution of the governmental plans and they publicly started some fierce 
discussions about the consequences of the plans for citizens and compensation.  
In the Lent case, the citizen group was part of the advisory committee of the 
project organisation. However, because they were not satisfied with the proposed project 
plan and opportunities for meaningful deliberation, they were also developing their own 
alternative. The number of media reports peaked when the local council supported the 
citizen group’s alternative. This led to a difficult position for the responsible alderman 
(the political executive), who was negotiating with the national government.  
In the IJsseldelta case, the concerned citizen group became involved relatively 
late. Although interactive sessions were organised here, this citizen group became 
involved in the sessions when the project plans became more concrete. The peak in news 
reports is in 2007–2008 when this citizen group strongly protested against the proposed 
development of the bypass, particularly with regard to the housing plans (see Van Buuren 
et al. 2010). They were able to put their concerns on the agenda of the local council. 
Subsequently, housing in the Zwartendijk area was postponed by the local council. 
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Figure 1. Media attention in the different rounds of decision making in IJsseldelta-Zuid, Lent and 
Noordwaard 
Note: X-axis = time period. Each time period is a decision-making round. Y-axis = number of media 
reports. 
 
We can conclude that media attention was not constant during the three decision-
making processes. Media attention increased at times of conflict between citizens and 
political authorities around the plans. This is when the legitimacy of important aspects of 
the policy plans were most contested by the citizen groups. 
 
 
The presence of media logic in the news reports 
Table 2 shows that all information biases appear in the news reporting on the 
water management projects. In most of the reports (more than 60% of all reports in each 
project) at least one of the information biases is present. The authority–disorder bias and 
the negativity bias are most often present, whereas the personalisation bias appears less 
often. The media logic presence seems to be the strongest in the Lent case (78% versus 
64 and 62%). An explanation could be that in this case the citizen group proposed an 
extensive alternative plan, not only challenging and discussing the governmental plan, 
but really competing with it.
viii
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Table 2. Information biases in the news 
Biases                                      Media reports 
IJsseldelta-Zuid (%)       Lent (%)             Noordwaard (%) 
Dramatisation bias  
 
23.0 46.4 26.9 
Personalisation bias  
 
16.0 13.4 19.3 
Authority–disorder bias 
 
42.0 68.0 36.6 
Negativity bias 
 
45.0 54.6 40.8 
1 or more biases present in media report 64.0 78.4 62.4 
 
Presence of media logic in reports on citizen groups versus reports on executive 
politicians 
In Table 3, we report how the information biases relate to citizen groups as key 
subject and to executive politicians as key subject. Clear positive relations exist between 
information biases and citizen groups as key subject, especially with regard to 
dramatisation, personalisation and negativity. Stories about them contain more conflict, 
more human interest, more negativity towards the water project. The citizen groups do 
not seem to demand significantly more often than other groups of key actors that 
governmental authorities should take actions (authority–disorder bias). 
In all three cases, reports about citizen groups score high on the personalisation 
bias. Reports on the citizen group in the IJsseldelta-Zuid case score highest in relation to 
dramatisation and the Lent citizen group in relation to negativity.  
In contrast, we see in Table 3 no or only small negative relations between 
executive politicians and information biases. Significant negative correlations would 
show that, when executive politicians are key subject in a media report, the report has 
significantly fewer information biases. This would mean that reports are more positive, 
less dramatised, less personalised and have fewer demands for action by a governmental 
authority. This is probably what executive politicians strive for in media attention on their 
projects. Some politicians, especially concerning IJsseldelta-Zuid, seem to indeed 
succeed in telling their side of the story: reports are significantly less dramatised and 
more positive towards the project. However, in Lent and Noordwaard, these negative 
correlations are much smaller and not significant. Apparently, the executive politicians in 
17 
 
these projects have more difficulty getting a more positive and less dramatised image of 
the project into the news. 
 
Table 3. Relations between the information biases and the citizen groups/executive politicians 
*** Correlation is significant at a .001 level (2-tailed).  
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed). 
Note: We measured media attention on the citizen groups/executive politicians by the variable in which 
they were coded as the most important actor in the news report. 
 
 
Mediatised legitimacy 
In summary, the quantitative analysis of the media reports reveals that the media 
attention is quite erratic. Media attention increases in the rounds in which the legitimacy 
concerning the policy plans from the citizen groups’ perspective is under most pressure. 
Furthermore, the findings show that executive politicians do receive media attention, but 
this attention does not always show a more positive side of the water projects. Media 
logic seems to make it harder for executive politicians to publicly legitimate their 
decisions and obtain broad social support for the water project via media reports, 
especially because citizen groups attract a lot of media attention as well; but this attention 
reflects many information biases. At several junctures, the citizen groups criticised the 
legitimacy of the policy plans and fought for their interests, deploying different strategies, 
such as arranging protest actions, designing alternative measures and/or participating in 
discussion forums. Media attention thereby potentially increased their power position. 
They seem to use the media and media logic quite well.  
We conducted interviews with both citizen groups and executive politicians to 
further examine how they make use of the media in their political communication and 
how media logic consequently affects the three democratic legitimacy sources. 
                       Citizen groups in                 Executive politicians in 
 IJsseldelta-
Zuid  
N= 24(100) 
Lent  
 
N= 31(97) 
Noordwaard  
 
N= 43(93) 
 IJsseldelta-
Zuid  
N= 34(100) 
Lent  
 
N= 34(97) 
Noordwaard 
 
N= 15(93) 
Dramatisation bias .446*** .216* .257*   -.294**  -.176  -.201 
Personalisation bias .416*** .430** .388**   -.117  -.193  -.234* 
Authority–disorder 
bias 
.091 .138 .081   -.012  -.145  .092 
Negativity bias  .207* .371** .226*   -.255*  -.182  -.142 
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Voice: media attention to influence the decision-making process 
In all three cases, we observed citizen groups succeeding in attracting much media 
attention; in about a quarter to half of the media reports they were the key subjects in 
media reports (Table 1). The media reports were crucial in making them and their 
viewpoints known to the wider public and to the authorities. This strategy can get a much 
faster reply from the formal decision-making authorities, as the spokesman for the 
Noordwaard citizen group argues: ‘I was amazed by how soon the Minister of State 
reacted to such a report in the newspaper.’   
This media attention can contribute to changing decisions within the process. 
Although in the three cases the water storage plans and the other activities were not that 
much altered, some smaller decisions were made in favour of the citizen groups. In the 
IJsseldelta-Zuid case, the municipal council changed its decision about housing in the 
area in response to the actions of the citizen group and the consequent extensive media 
attention. In the Lent case, the citizens’ alternative plan has been incorporated in the 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), funded by the national government. 
Furthermore, the citizens pleaded for measures against seepage water. The publicity 
around these problems bolstered their viewpoint, as the alderman noted. Consequently, 
the municipality invested more money in instruments to prevent the area from seepage 
water and to monitor this. Regarding Noordwaard, the alderman noted that he created 
fewer recreational facilities to make concessions to the citizens, publicising his stance 
through the press.  
How did these citizens obtain media attention for their story? As stated in the 
previous section, media attention on the citizen groups related strongly to the information 
biases of dramatisation, personalisation and negativity. Therefore, citizen groups’ 
representatives used protest actions to attract journalists. ‘You need something visual, 
something which they [the journalists] can see and you must provide some drama,’ as the 
spokesman for the IJsseldelta-Zuid citizen group argued. One of their actions entailed 
driving a car with a homemade ‘dike’ on it through the city, with water leaking out of this 
dike. Children could stick their finger in the little holes in the dike; that led to speaking 
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pictures in the local press. In the Lent case, the citizen group marked the route of the new 
dike with black flags. These kinds of actions play to media logic.  
Besides these protest actions, citizen groups provided journalists with information 
about their viewpoints directly by emails, telephone calls or even a press conference. 
Letters written to governmental institutions were often also sent to the media. 
Furthermore, we found that they often showed awareness of journalistic needs. As the 
Lent citizen group representative noted: ‘Some journalists were interested in the emotions 
of citizens who had to leave because of the relocation of the dike. I assessed what kind of 
story they wanted. Did they want a really emotional story? then I sent them to inhabitant 
A, did they want a more sober story? I sent them to inhabitant B.’  
The citizens also found that less dramatic or negative stories were less attractive 
to the media. The Noordwaard citizen group representative stated that the press did not 
report on their collaborative experience with the political authorities in the first rounds of 
the decision-making process. Although this collaboration did not pass off easily, the 
citizen group was committed to collaborate. ‘The concerned journalist judged “this is not 
controversial enough, we won’t come to report on your story”.’  
Overall, the citizen groups’ representatives were satisfied with the media 
reporting on their case. Media logic seems to help citizens, especially when they 
explicitly protest against the measures proposed by the political authorities. The easy 
accessibility of the spokesmen and their feeling for media logic, communicating simple 
and dramatised messages certainly seemed to help in this matter. But what does this mean 
for the quality of the debate? 
 
Due deliberation: media attention broadens the scope of the deliberative process 
In all cases, we observed a widening of the scope of the deliberative process consequent 
to the activities of the citizen groups and the attention they received from the media. By 
following the media, the aldermen received more information on citizens’ viewpoints. By 
keeping in contact with the local journalist, the aldermen received more information 
about citizens’ concerns. ‘Just by keeping in touch with the local journalist, I got much 
information about the concerns of citizens in the area. You receive signals. They [the 
citizens] don’t tell me everything, but they do tell [the local journalist] this,’ as the 
20 
 
Nijmegen alderman stated. In the IJsseldelta-Zuid case, the alderman noted on this 
matter: ‘I don’t experience this [the media attention on the citizen group] all in a 
negative manner. It has created more attention for certain aspects, such as the safety 
level, and provided more accurate information and transparency.’ The Noordwaard 
alderman argued: ‘The media performed quite well for the inhabitants, enabling them to 
express their criticism, as well as for us, making the signals stronger, so that we 
addressed those criticisms in our conversations with the ministry, on behalf of the 
inhabitants.’ By providing more information on the citizens’ concerns, the media 
reporting has thus broadened the scope of the deliberation process in the three cases.   
However, media logic also caused a certain shift in focus, namely, a focus on 
negativity, drama, disorder and some human interest. As we saw in the quantitative 
content analysis, a majority of the media reports show at least one of the information 
biases. In this matter, the alderman responsible for IJsseldelta-Zuid argued that the media 
debate ‘alluded to emotion, not to facts or the content of the plan.’ Moreover, the media 
often seemed to side with the opposing citizen groups. ‘Generally, the media mainly 
choose the critical side,’ the Noordwaard alderman noted. The alderman in the Lent case 
aptly remarked: ‘the citizen group receives rather much attention and they realise rather 
much participation space, although the governmental experts are convinced that the 
other plan is surely much better.’ The alderman in the IJsseldelta-Zuid case questioned 
the extent to which the viewpoints in the media really represented the viewpoints 
included in the decision-making process: ‘people who said that they were not involved in 
the process received maximum attention, whereas people who said they were involved, 
received minimum media attention.’  
The quality of the deliberation process is thus to some extent increased by more 
information. However, at the same time, the quality might be decreased, since we can 
question the diversity of the perspectives covered in the media reporting. Media logic 
seems to restrict this diversity. 
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Accountability: more reactive position than proactive communication due to 
dramatisation 
The authorities needed media attention to obtain social support for the water project 
plans. When the national governmental decision about Space for the River had to be 
made, the ministry also used the press. The Lent citizen group representative argued: ‘By 
short movies with an image of chairs in water, and images of floods in the future in the 
Netherlands, they argued that the Netherlands should take measures. They prepared us 
for the fact that much money is going to be spent on water management.’  
However, it is not that easy to explain decisions in the media. As the correlations 
in Table 3 show, executive politicians cannot always ‘escape’ the presence of information 
biases in the media representation of their stories. Executive politicians’ stories may be 
presented in a more negative and dramatised way than they want. In the Lent case, this 
was indeed so. The local authorities presented the project plans enthusiastically by 
showing how the area would look after the dike shift. The alderman stated: ‘we wanted to 
communicate that this water project is also an opportunity for the area. But this came 
back as a boomerang. (…) The press thought it was pitiful for the inhabitants.’ The 
media focused on the 50 dwellings that had to be removed from Lent village, and thus on 
stories of grief and the citizen group’s alternative plan. A success story for the local 
authority in the media is ‘like rubbing salt in a wound,’ the alderman stated.  
However, he kept close contact with the journalist from the local newspaper, the 
most important news medium with regard to this project. ‘I informed him upfront, told 
him about the considerations. Sometimes I gave him things, sometimes a scoop. I called 
him a lot, and was always available to him. He could even call me at eleven o’clock in 
the evening, if he wanted to. And I never ran away from him.’ Nevertheless, this 
journalist always combined the alderman’s story with that of the inhabitants, he argued. 
This was not always positive for the legitimising of the alderman’s actions and decisions. 
The alderman in the IJsseldelta-Zuid case had a similar experience. He described media 
reports after press conferences as ‘only one quarter of the page which covers our part of 
the story and three quarters of the page was filled with the citizen group’s story.’  
The political authorities had trouble proactively ‘selling’ their project to the 
public. According to the Kampen alderman, the political authorities ‘were frequently 
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pushed into a reactive position, instead of proactively communicating about the project. 
This almost killed our project, because it strongly influenced the public image.’ The 
IJsseldelta-Zuid citizen group played an important role in this matter. According to them, 
the bypass would create more possible victims in the event of flooding than the scenario 
without a bypass. This made it very hard for the political authorities to communicate their 
plans. ‘You find yourself in a reactive position, although it [citizen group’s statement] 
was bullshit, because we can prove that it is incorrect. However, you have to react to 
their story, while the tone is already set. And if the media do not hear you at the same 
time, but the next day or something, your story comes second. Then, things become 
complicated.’ This example shows how political authorities sometimes have to fight 
against a public image which, according to them, is highly incorrect. This public image 
can delegitimise their proposed decisions or plans. Recently, the authorities involved in 
the project consciously decided not to react anymore to all negative stories in the media. 
‘When we, the steering committee, gave less attention to these stories, we noticed that 
journalistic attention for them disappeared as well,’ the alderman argued. Hence, 
ignoring negative stories in the media can also be a communication strategy.  
In contrast, the alderman involved in the Noordwaard project noted that listening 
to and dealing with the emotions of citizens and showing that he understands them is a 
major part of his message to the press: ‘always show the press that you can handle 
empathy and emotions well as a governor,’ he declared. In that regard, he thought it 
important to openly make concessions on his plans for recreational facilities and mediate 
for the relevant inhabitants in the compensation negotiations. This is more comparable to 
the strategies of the alderman in Lent.  
Nevertheless, what all aldermen have in common is a more reactive 
communication strategy, to which they sometimes feel condemned by the role of the 
media and media logic in the projects.  
 
The findings in sections 3.1 and 3.2 are summarised in Table 4. 
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Table 4. Influence of media logic on the sources of legitimacy 
 Role of media Media logic  
Voice The media are a vehicle to 
generate attention for certain 
issues and to gain influence 
Increases 
possibilities  
The citizen groups succeed in attracting media 
attention by adapting to media logic and are able to 
put their issues on the political agenda. 
Due deliberation The media as watchdog, as a 
check and balance in the 
process, platform for diverse 
deliberations 
Increases 
possibilities 
The deliberation process is broadened by the 
perspectives of the citizen groups, partly because of 
media attention. 
Decreases 
possibilities 
Since media are more interested in entertaining 
stories, with a focus on conflicts and drama, this 
partly reduces the quality of the deliberation 
process. Images seem more important than well 
elaborated deliberations.The media are a platform 
more for the citizen groups than for the authorities. 
Accountability The media are a 
communication channel for 
generating transparency and 
accountability 
Decreases 
possibilities  
The media sometimes force political authorities into 
a reactive communication style: they have to fight 
against a negative image. Proactive communication, 
such as branding, is difficult in the context of the 
citizens’ dramatic stories. 
 
 
Conclusion and Discussion 
Although theoretical and empirical work on the democratic legitimacy of governance 
networks is growing (e.g. Pierre 2000, Papadopoulos 2003, Sørensen and Torfing 2005, 
van Meerkerk et al. 2014), the role of the media and particularly media logic in this 
respect has so far been neglected. In this research, we aimed to start to fill this lacuna. 
Before we present our conclusions however, we want to mention several important 
research choices and limitations of our study. A first important choice was the local-level 
focus. Media communications by politicians may be characterised by a lower level of 
professionalisation than is described by the national-level focused literature on PR and 
news management (cf. Davis 2002, Cook 2005). Local-level politicians often have fewer 
resources regarding communication, but this may differ between organisations and 
projects. Furthermore, as we studied cases in the field of water management, our results 
cannot automatically be assumed to hold for other types of public projects or policy 
domains. The role of the media in less technical and more controversial public issues is 
likely to be stronger, especially because of media logic.  
We can conclude that the media attention in the three cases was highly inconstant. 
This is in line with other research (Cobb and Elder 1983, Baumgartner and Jones 2009). 
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Most media attention occurred in the decision rounds in which citizen groups strongly 
contested the policy plans. This points to the role and presence of media logic, with its 
focus on conflict and negativity, as was confirmed by the results of the content analysis. 
Although in a lot of the literature the role of the media in legitimacy relations is 
stressed (e.g. Bang 2003, Habermas 2006, Louw 2007), the role of media logic in these 
relationships is not yet well examined. In this study, media logic extended the 
possibilities for citizen groups to voice their views. The citizen groups in our cases seem 
to know how the media work and are capable of adapting their stories to media logic. 
They often strategically strove for media attention, and they benefitted from media logic 
to challenge political authorities and influence the decision-making process. This is in 
line with Schudson’s (2009) claim that the characteristics of media logic give journalists 
and citizens the possibility to subvert established power in a deliberative process. 
However, these mediatised voice possibilities for citizens are dependent on the capacity 
and will of citizens to adapt to media logic. This means that citizen groups need to 
provide some drama and conflicts, otherwise journalists will not be that interested (see 
also Cook 2005, Hajer 2009). 
In the case studies, we observed that citizen groups deployed media strategies at 
times when they were losing faith in the interactive governance process (Noordwaard, 
Lent) or when they were fighting for their last chance to influence the decision-making 
process (IJsseldelta-South). Although these media strategies extend their influence 
possibilities, they are not without risks. They could influence trust relationships between 
the citizen groups and the other actors or even isolate them from the interactive 
governance process. There are also other challenges. To what extent is it legitimate to 
listen to these actors, barking loudly in the media, while other stakeholders are trying to 
reach compromises in an interactive setting? The aldermen in both the Lent and the 
IJsseldelta-Zuid case experienced this dilemma. Further research could be done to 
examine what kind of dilemmas actors within governance networks face in this respect 
and how they deal with them. 
Furthermore, through the workings of media logic, the deliberation process 
broadened, but this did not improve the quality of this process per se, as negative and 
dramatised images seem to dominate over substantial argumentation. This connects with 
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the literature that doubts the quality of media reporting, providing more drama and less 
information about the complexity of societal issues from different viewpoints (e.g. 
Patterson 2000, Bennett 2009). Extensive qualitative content analysis of media reports 
could lead to firmer claims in this regard.  
A next conclusion is that local political authorities had great difficulty 
legitimising their actions. The literature suggests that authorities could proactively use the 
media to ‘sell’ their policies (Davis 2002, Cook 2005, Bennett 2009, Eshuis and Klijn 
2012), but the political authorities did not really feel capable of doing this as they were 
pushed into a rather reactive position (cf. Hajer 2009).  
In this study, we thus see a mediatisation of legitimacy sources at certain stages of 
the policy process, namely, those that contain conflict and drama, leading to some 
changes in the policy process and outcomes in favour of citizen groups who are able to 
attract media attention. At these stages, media logic might overrule the logic of 
deliberative governance processes to some extent.  
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i
 As Sørensen (2002, 715) rightly points out: a governance network ‘exhibits and aggravates inherent 
problems in some of the basic concepts of liberal democracy.’ However, an extensive elaboration of the 
relationship between governance networks and traditional models of democracy is beyond the scope of this 
article. Interesting elaborations in this matter are, for example, provided by Sørensen (2002) and Dryzek 
(2007, 2010). 
ii
 In Teisman’s (2000) decision-making model, which relates especially to decision making and interactions 
between actors in governance networks, decision making is defined as an intertwined clew of a series of 
decisions taken by a variety of parties. The interactions between actors and the interdependence of actors 
are stressed. Rounds are distinguished by a crucial decision or event (e.g. the involvement of a new actor), 
defined by the researchers in retrospect, but based on the reconstruction of the process by the involved 
actors. The crucial decision or event is the beginning of a next round and generally serves as a focal point 
of reference for the actors involved. 
iii
 IJsseldelta-Zuid, dijkteruglegging Lent and Noordwaard. 
iv
 These categories can be found in Table 1. They are recoded as dummy variables. We used the dummy 
variables of ‘citizens group as key subject in news report’ and ‘executive politicians as key subject in news 
report’ in our further analysis.  
v
 In Dutch: werkgroep Zwartendijk (IJsseldelta-Zuid); Lentse Federatie (Lent); bewonersvereniging 
Bandijk (Noordwaard) 
vi
 The interview with the Werkendam alderman (Noordwaard case) is an exception in this matter. This 
interview was by telephone and took about 45 minutes. 
vii
 However, we must remark that regional television programmes are quite recent phenomena on the 
Internet. The earliest regional television item is from March 2006, and the date regional broadcasters 
started their broadcasting on the Internet may even differ per outlet. This may lead to small biases in the 
analysis.  
viii
 Furthermore, the particular history of the small village Lent, ‘annexed’ by the city of Nijmegen (‘David 
versus Goliath’ as the interviewees called it) in 1998, provided an interesting narrative for the media to 
mention.  
